“Multi-stakeholderism” must not be seen as a
panacea. It also must not become an ideological
commitment or article of faith.
Third, the “multi-stakeholder” descriptor is indeterminate — even within the Internet governance issue area, there are various kinds of multi-stakeholder governance. ICANN and the IETF can usefully be treated as limiting cases for the purpose of illustration. ICANN has a relatively formal governance structure headed by a board and a chief executive officer; board seats are allocated to particular stakeholder groups. The management is also counselled by a number of advisory committees. Among these, the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) is accorded special rights and powers by virtue of the fact that it represents states. When the GAC issues formal advice to the board, the board is obligated either to accept this advice or to justify its decision to the GAC and enter a reconciliation process. In contrast, the IETF is much less formalized and more consensus-based.The IETF does not have a formal membership structure, has a modest secretariat and its decisions on particular standards are made in the“Request for Comments” process that emphasizes technical soundness and expert consensus. Finally, people participate in IETF processes in their capacity as individuals rather than as representatives of organizations. Multi-stakeholder bodies thus vary in the kinds of stakeholders included and in the authority relations between those stakeholders. This variation means that understanding how a particular domain of Internet governance operates is impossible without additional information.
The conceptual starting point of this paper, and of CIGI’s Internet Governance project as a whole, is
Third, the “multi-stakeholder” descriptor is indeterminate — even within the Internet governance issue area, there are various kinds of multi-stakeholder governance. ICANN and the IETF can usefully be treated as limiting cases for the purpose of illustration. ICANN has a relatively formal governance structure headed by a board and a chief executive officer; board seats are allocated to particular stakeholder groups. The management is also counselled by a number of advisory committees. Among these, the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) is accorded special rights and powers by virtue of the fact that it represents states. When the GAC issues formal advice to the board, the board is obligated either to accept this advice or to justify its decision to the GAC and enter a reconciliation process. In contrast, the IETF is much less formalized and more consensus-based.The IETF does not have a formal membership structure, has a modest secretariat and its decisions on particular standards are made in the“Request for Comments” process that emphasizes technical soundness and expert consensus. Finally, people participate in IETF processes in their capacity as individuals rather than as representatives of organizations. Multi-stakeholder bodies thus vary in the kinds of stakeholders included and in the authority relations between those stakeholders. This variation means that understanding how a particular domain of Internet governance operates is impossible without additional information.
The conceptual starting point of this paper, and of CIGI’s Internet Governance project as a whole, is
that global governance consists of attempts to make,
alter, interpret and apply social rules. In the modern
international system, this is accomplished by
drawing on established (but sometimes unwritten)
procedural rules drawn from international law and
diplomacy (Raymond, 2011).
Our entire social world is made possible by sets of written and unwritten rules that direct our behaviour, shape our identities and define basic categories that determine the horizons of the possible. For example, the rules of chess define the objective or purpose of the game, establish conditions for victory and simultaneously empower and constrain the player to move pieces in various ways. These rules shape players’ behaviour in ways they may not fully realize. It would be strange to imagine a chess player physically threatening or attacking an opponent. Even the thought of doing so simply would not occur to most players and, if suggested, would likely be summarily dismissed.
Like chess, rule-making in diplomacy and global governance is a social game governed by rules. This rule-making game has extremely high stakes. The power and durability of rules ensure that the creation, alteration and interpretation of rules are some of the most intensely political human activities. The power to write the rules amounts to ruling over others.7
Our entire social world is made possible by sets of written and unwritten rules that direct our behaviour, shape our identities and define basic categories that determine the horizons of the possible. For example, the rules of chess define the objective or purpose of the game, establish conditions for victory and simultaneously empower and constrain the player to move pieces in various ways. These rules shape players’ behaviour in ways they may not fully realize. It would be strange to imagine a chess player physically threatening or attacking an opponent. Even the thought of doing so simply would not occur to most players and, if suggested, would likely be summarily dismissed.
Like chess, rule-making in diplomacy and global governance is a social game governed by rules. This rule-making game has extremely high stakes. The power and durability of rules ensure that the creation, alteration and interpretation of rules are some of the most intensely political human activities. The power to write the rules amounts to ruling over others.7
Internet governance has been complicated by the
collision of at least five different sets of procedural
rules. The first, employed most consistently by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) states, is drawn from
international law and diplomacy. These rules have
increasingly been codified, in large part due to the
work of the International Law Commission, which
played a significant role in the development of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, among
other instruments. The International Court of Justice
has also played a key role in establishing procedures
for determining, interpreting and applying both
treaty law and customary international law. The
result is a set of generally well-understood (if
admittedly not always followed) procedural rules.
These rules require good faith conduct, encourage
what has been called “thick multilateralism” and
specifically empower states as the actors competent
to make, change, interpret and apply rules, either
directly or by delegating these tasks to international
organizations and other agents.8
A second set of rules is embraced most prominently by Russia and China, the core members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russian and Chinese conduct suggests a preference for procedural rules that accord the state significant latitude (both with respect to domestic actors and to international monitoring, whether by other states or by international organizations) and that privilege great powers over secondary states. In many respects, this view of procedures for rule-making resembles nineteenth-century practice.
A second set of rules is embraced most prominently by Russia and China, the core members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russian and Chinese conduct suggests a preference for procedural rules that accord the state significant latitude (both with respect to domestic actors and to international monitoring, whether by other states or by international organizations) and that privilege great powers over secondary states. In many respects, this view of procedures for rule-making resembles nineteenth-century practice.
Third, some basic similarities on procedural rules
can be identified among the members of the
Group of 77 (G-77).9 While this group of states is
culturally heterodox, they can generally be said to
prioritize the principle of sovereign equality and to
be highly concerned about issues of equity. These
commitments reflect the colonial experiences of the
vast majority of G-77 members.
These alternate interpretations of legitimate procedural rules nevertheless bear a clear family resemblance in that they accord a central place to states. In contrast, there are two sets of procedural rules that do not do so. The rejection of a role, or at least a privileged role, for states in Internet governance is, in some respects, part and parcel of a democratizing trend in international relations; this pattern has been repeated across a number of issue areas, including trade, the environment, human rights, global economic governance and even international security (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; O’Brien et al., 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002; Price, 1998; Glasius, 2006). One early expression of these ideas can be found in John Perry Barlow’s 1996 articulation of “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.”10
Corporate procedural rules are hierarchical in nature, entail executive decision making that is subject to investor oversight and are rooted in contract law. These rules shape the understanding and approach
of key players such as network operators, equipment manufacturers, software companies and companies that provide online services (for example, Google and Facebook).
and by major Western militaries.13 Relying on
the mistaken understanding of the Internet as a
commons encourages overly expansive approaches
to Internet governance, which apply rules with
insufficient regard for differences between issues
and that neglect the importance of fostering the
club governance arrangements that can ensure the
continued smooth development of the Internet’s
multitude of clubs.
This view of the Internet facilitates a more nuanced
discussion of online rights and responsibilities, one
The major exception to this lack of strategic vision,
unfortunately, has been the coalition of states (led by
Russia and China) seeking the greatest degree of state
control over the Internet. These states have sought to trade cynically on the global legitimacy of the UN
system in order to consecrate the worst excesses of
state conduct against domestic populations. They
have done so while simultaneously developing and
deploying significant offensive cyber capabilities.
Wortham, Jenna (2012). “Public Outcry Over Antipiracy
Bills Began as Grass-Roots Grumbling.” New York
Times, January 19. Available at: www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/20/technology/public-outcry-over-
antipiracy-bills-began-as-grass-roots-grumbling.
html?pagewanted=all.
These alternate interpretations of legitimate procedural rules nevertheless bear a clear family resemblance in that they accord a central place to states. In contrast, there are two sets of procedural rules that do not do so. The rejection of a role, or at least a privileged role, for states in Internet governance is, in some respects, part and parcel of a democratizing trend in international relations; this pattern has been repeated across a number of issue areas, including trade, the environment, human rights, global economic governance and even international security (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; O’Brien et al., 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002; Price, 1998; Glasius, 2006). One early expression of these ideas can be found in John Perry Barlow’s 1996 articulation of “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.”10
Corporate procedural rules are hierarchical in nature, entail executive decision making that is subject to investor oversight and are rooted in contract law. These rules shape the understanding and approach
of key players such as network operators, equipment manufacturers, software companies and companies that provide online services (for example, Google and Facebook).
Finally, there is a distinct view on legitimate
procedures for rule-making in the technology
community. This view emphasizes distributed, peer-
producedrule-makingonthebasisofroughconsensus.
Influence and authority are typically derived from
expertise rather than organizational roles, and claim
to represent a community or financial interest. These
views have sparked determined opposition to state
involvement in Internet governance on the part of
“hacktivist”groups, and have led them to minimize
substantive differences between the positions of
states (Coleman, forthcoming 2013). Whether such
a system would be workable at the global level or
broadly accepted as legitimate by mass publics is
beside the point, which is that these expectations
(however unrealistic they may be in the short term)
are driving the reactions and behaviour of these
actors, as well as (in more muted form) the views
of legacy institutions of Internet governance such as
ICANN and the IETF.
The existence of these distinct views on how to legitimately make and interpret rules for Internet governance has had, and will continue to have, significant effects on actual outcomes. A full accounting of these is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few significant examples can be briefly enumerated. First, while it is unlikely that the relationship between ICANN and the US government is the source of Russian and Chinese desires for alternate Internet governance bodies, the relationship causes significant political unease in a range of states because it raises concerns over state sovereignty. Specifically, the concern is that the United States is able to unilaterally make decisions that affect the entire global community
The existence of these distinct views on how to legitimately make and interpret rules for Internet governance has had, and will continue to have, significant effects on actual outcomes. A full accounting of these is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few significant examples can be briefly enumerated. First, while it is unlikely that the relationship between ICANN and the US government is the source of Russian and Chinese desires for alternate Internet governance bodies, the relationship causes significant political unease in a range of states because it raises concerns over state sovereignty. Specifically, the concern is that the United States is able to unilaterally make decisions that affect the entire global community
of Internet users, including other states. At a
minimum, this is a powerful rhetorical weapon.
Second, existing procedural rules provided a basis
to exclude hacktivists and many other segments
of civil society from WCIT negotiations. Third, this
decision sparked DDoS attacks on the ITU website
during the conference, and has arguably made
further such disruptions more likely in the future.
Fourth, whether as the result of a daring attempt
to manipulate procedural rules or a lack of social
competence in utilizing them, negotiations on
the updated ITRs collapsed over a controversial
procedural move, in which what was purported
to be an informal poll was treated ex post facto as
an official and authoritative vote on an important
question, in contravention of the ITU’s established
tradition of consensus decisions (Pfanner, 2012).
This incident led, finally, to the rejection of the ITRs
and the accompanying resolutions by a significant
minority of states, including the bulk of the advanced
industrial democracies.
Under established international procedural rules, this outcome could potentially significantly complicate international telecommunications, as it creates a situation where there will be two treaties concurrently in force on the same subject matter. Such situations are explicitly contemplated by Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.11 The general approach is to determine applicable rules of law according to the treaty in force between the specific states involved in a particular instance of conduct governed under the treaties. This general approach yields four possible cases: where both states are parties only to the 1988 ITRs, those terms apply; where one state is party only to the 1988 ITRs and the other is party to both the 1988 and 2012 ITRs, the 1988 ITRs apply; where both states are parties to the 2012 ITRs, those terms apply; and where one state is party only to the 1988 ITRs and the other state is party only to the 2012 ITRs, there is no treaty in force between those two states and, thus, no legally binding rules. The fourth case is the most immediately problematic of the four, although the larger problem in the long term is the overall degree of complexity introduced into the governance of international telecommunications, the potential for increased transaction costs and the eventual possibility of significant divergence between the two treaty regimes over time. Given the similarity between the two treaties, as well as the long history of routine cooperation on international telecommunications and the resulting business relationships and accumulated social practice, there are reasons to believe that this complexity may be manageable, if suboptimal. This assessment may not apply, however, in the event that the parties to the new ITRs engage in subsequent negotiations, building on the accompanying resolutions to erect a parallel institution for Internet governance. In the event such a parallel institution duplicates the function of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority or the IETF, the potential exists for serious harm to global interoperability. Further, since routing is currently done without regard for international borders, the existence of parallel Internet governance regimes that may evolve with very different privacy protections poses challenging questions about the sustainability and desirability of legacy routing practices.
Under established international procedural rules, this outcome could potentially significantly complicate international telecommunications, as it creates a situation where there will be two treaties concurrently in force on the same subject matter. Such situations are explicitly contemplated by Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.11 The general approach is to determine applicable rules of law according to the treaty in force between the specific states involved in a particular instance of conduct governed under the treaties. This general approach yields four possible cases: where both states are parties only to the 1988 ITRs, those terms apply; where one state is party only to the 1988 ITRs and the other is party to both the 1988 and 2012 ITRs, the 1988 ITRs apply; where both states are parties to the 2012 ITRs, those terms apply; and where one state is party only to the 1988 ITRs and the other state is party only to the 2012 ITRs, there is no treaty in force between those two states and, thus, no legally binding rules. The fourth case is the most immediately problematic of the four, although the larger problem in the long term is the overall degree of complexity introduced into the governance of international telecommunications, the potential for increased transaction costs and the eventual possibility of significant divergence between the two treaty regimes over time. Given the similarity between the two treaties, as well as the long history of routine cooperation on international telecommunications and the resulting business relationships and accumulated social practice, there are reasons to believe that this complexity may be manageable, if suboptimal. This assessment may not apply, however, in the event that the parties to the new ITRs engage in subsequent negotiations, building on the accompanying resolutions to erect a parallel institution for Internet governance. In the event such a parallel institution duplicates the function of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority or the IETF, the potential exists for serious harm to global interoperability. Further, since routing is currently done without regard for international borders, the existence of parallel Internet governance regimes that may evolve with very different privacy protections poses challenging questions about the sustainability and desirability of legacy routing practices.
The key question is how to update and refine systems
for Internet governance in light of the general
increase in interest on the part of states, geopolitical
rivalry, the existence of legacy institutions and intense
commitment to the status quo by a wide array of
civil society actors. Disagreement on legitimate
procedural rules also greatly complicates what is
already a daunting task. This suggests the need to
focus consciously on a procedural modus vivendi in
order to prevent negotiations and discussions from
foundering on procedural grounds.
Viewing Internet governance as a matter of making, interpreting and applying rules yields two other important insights. First, the Internet is not governed by a single set of rules. Accordingly, the misleading assertion that the Internet is a commons should be abandoned in favour of the more nuanced view that it is comprised of a series of overlapping voluntary and involuntary groupings governed by a heterodox variety of written and unwritten rules.12 This move has the advantage of more effectively delineating issues where global coordination is required and those where varying degrees of subsidiarity are possible, and even desirable. It also clearly highlights the importance of the rules that govern different social groups. Second, it is important not to conflate rules and law; rather, there are good reasons to take a broad view of the available means for accomplishing Internet governance. It is vital to avoid the mistake of fixating on multilateral treaties and formal international organizations. The current political context and the nature of the issues indicate that soft law instruments are likely to be more plausible and more effective.
The assertion that the Internet is a commons is made, paradoxically, both by civil society activists
Viewing Internet governance as a matter of making, interpreting and applying rules yields two other important insights. First, the Internet is not governed by a single set of rules. Accordingly, the misleading assertion that the Internet is a commons should be abandoned in favour of the more nuanced view that it is comprised of a series of overlapping voluntary and involuntary groupings governed by a heterodox variety of written and unwritten rules.12 This move has the advantage of more effectively delineating issues where global coordination is required and those where varying degrees of subsidiarity are possible, and even desirable. It also clearly highlights the importance of the rules that govern different social groups. Second, it is important not to conflate rules and law; rather, there are good reasons to take a broad view of the available means for accomplishing Internet governance. It is vital to avoid the mistake of fixating on multilateral treaties and formal international organizations. The current political context and the nature of the issues indicate that soft law instruments are likely to be more plausible and more effective.
The assertion that the Internet is a commons is made, paradoxically, both by civil society activists
Economists define a commons as a good that is
rivalrous and non-excludable.14 A good is rivalrous if
it cannot be used simultaneously by multiple people
or if its use by one person reduces the quantity and/
or quality of the good available for others. A good is
non-excludable if people cannot be prevented from
using it (whether on the basis of payment or some
other similar principle). Neither of these criteria are
applicable to the Internet.
The Internet is technically rivalrous in the sense that the computer networks on which it depends (its “physical layer”) accommodate a finite amount of traffic. At peak usage times, especially in congested sections of the network, users may receive a degraded experience — that is, bandwidth-intensive use by alarge number of users may mean that many receive lower-quality service.15
The Internet is technically rivalrous in the sense that the computer networks on which it depends (its “physical layer”) accommodate a finite amount of traffic. At peak usage times, especially in congested sections of the network, users may receive a degraded experience — that is, bandwidth-intensive use by alarge number of users may mean that many receive lower-quality service.15
In practice, however, such problems have relatively
easy solutions: more physical infrastructure (fibre
optic cable, switches and routers) can be constructed,
easing congestion; more efficient protocols for routing
and directing traffic can perform a similar function,
directing traffic through portions of the network
with excess capacity; and usage-based billing can
incentivize users to moderate their consumption of
bandwidth. These three solutions are already part of
Internet governance, and while there are potential
drawbacks or limitations associated with each,
there is little reason to expect that combinations of
such policies cannot continue to meet demand for
bandwidth, given appropriate investment strategies.
The case for regarding the Internet as non-excludable is even weaker than the case for believing that it is rivalrous. Multiple kinds of exclusion are already occurring, many of them at the Internet’s physical layer.
First, many states already employ their domestic law to block various kinds of content, including child pornography, hate speech, intellectual property violations and political dissent. This kind of exclusion is typically accomplished by requiring ISPs to prevent the resolution of certain domain names and their associated Internet Protocol addresses. In the extreme, it entails states ordering the physical shutdown of Internet service. The governments of Egypt and Myanmar have both employed this tactic,
The case for regarding the Internet as non-excludable is even weaker than the case for believing that it is rivalrous. Multiple kinds of exclusion are already occurring, many of them at the Internet’s physical layer.
First, many states already employ their domestic law to block various kinds of content, including child pornography, hate speech, intellectual property violations and political dissent. This kind of exclusion is typically accomplished by requiring ISPs to prevent the resolution of certain domain names and their associated Internet Protocol addresses. In the extreme, it entails states ordering the physical shutdown of Internet service. The governments of Egypt and Myanmar have both employed this tactic,
albeit for limited periods of time Second, some recently proposed pieces of legislation
(for example, the Stop Online Piracy Act, or SOPA,
in the US Congress, and Bill C-32 in the Canadian
Parliament) have sought to strengthen copyright
protections, including requiring Web hosting
companies, search engines and ISPs to sever
relations with websites and users found to violate
copyright. While such measures have met strong
resistance, it is likely they will remain on the agenda
at the insistence of copyright-owning firms.
Third, DDoS attacks accomplish short-term exclusion
by bombarding a targeted website with requests
for information, overwhelming server capacity and
preventing servicing of legitimate requests. These
attacks are inexpensive and sometimes difficult
to attribute to particular agents, making them an
attractive option for hackers and for cybercriminals.
They are also blunt instruments, which can have
significant unintended consequences such as
denying access to additional, unintended targets.
Finally, they allow virtually anyone with minimal
technical expertise and computer hardware to
engage in excluding others from the Internet.
Fourth, it is possible to exclude people from the Internet by destroying physical infrastructure (fibre or wireless) critical to their connectivity. Such attacks are imaginable both in the context of terrorism and in the context of a major military conflict. While the decentralized nature of the Internet means that terrorist attacks would be unlikely to cause widespread long-term disruption, major military conflict could pose a significant risk to the Internet.
If the Internet is, in fact, non-rivalrous and excludable, it more closely resembles what economists call a club good. Club goods include access to satellite television or the status that comes with a country
Fourth, it is possible to exclude people from the Internet by destroying physical infrastructure (fibre or wireless) critical to their connectivity. Such attacks are imaginable both in the context of terrorism and in the context of a major military conflict. While the decentralized nature of the Internet means that terrorist attacks would be unlikely to cause widespread long-term disruption, major military conflict could pose a significant risk to the Internet.
If the Internet is, in fact, non-rivalrous and excludable, it more closely resembles what economists call a club good. Club goods include access to satellite television or the status that comes with a country
club membership. Experience tells us that some clubs
are more exclusive than others, and that different
clubs have varying rules, norms and bylaws. The
Internet is easily mistaken for a commons because
it has historically been an extremely open club, with
incredibly sparse rules for its members.
In some ways, barriers to joining the club continue to fall rapidly: Internet access is more affordable for more people than it has ever been. However, in other important respects, the Internet club looks not only less like a commons than it once did, but also less like a single club.
Rules increasingly circumscribe user behaviour online and pockets of the Internet are now more likely to allow access only to members — with highly variable requirements for membership, ranging from unverified assertions that a user is above a certain age or resides in a particular place (often employed to restrict access to various kinds of entertainment content), to contractual arrangements on a fee-for- service basis (such as pay walls on major newspaper websites), to requirements that the user be a member of a particular offline organization such as a corporation or government.
Accordingly, the Internet is best understood as a set of nested clubs. At the most basic level, all Internet users are members of the club of people with Internet connections. However, they are also members of smaller clubs composed of people who access the Internet via a particular ISP, and people who access the Internet from a particular country. It is impossible for an Internet user to avoid membership in any of these three kinds of clubs. Beyond this minimal baseline, users will typically also be members of other clubs based on their personal identities and interests.
In some ways, barriers to joining the club continue to fall rapidly: Internet access is more affordable for more people than it has ever been. However, in other important respects, the Internet club looks not only less like a commons than it once did, but also less like a single club.
Rules increasingly circumscribe user behaviour online and pockets of the Internet are now more likely to allow access only to members — with highly variable requirements for membership, ranging from unverified assertions that a user is above a certain age or resides in a particular place (often employed to restrict access to various kinds of entertainment content), to contractual arrangements on a fee-for- service basis (such as pay walls on major newspaper websites), to requirements that the user be a member of a particular offline organization such as a corporation or government.
Accordingly, the Internet is best understood as a set of nested clubs. At the most basic level, all Internet users are members of the club of people with Internet connections. However, they are also members of smaller clubs composed of people who access the Internet via a particular ISP, and people who access the Internet from a particular country. It is impossible for an Internet user to avoid membership in any of these three kinds of clubs. Beyond this minimal baseline, users will typically also be members of other clubs based on their personal identities and interests.
that recognizes that different areas of the Internet
may correspond closely with the open-access norms
associated with commons regimes while others
may not, and that while trade-offs between distinct
public values such as liberty, property rights and
security may not be entirely avoidable, applying
different rules to particular portions of the Internet
can help ensure that restrictions on online rights are
minimized and do not cause unintended collateral
damage to freedom.
Understanding the Internet as a set of nested clubs calls attention to the need to think explicitly about the rules for the three most basic types of clubs: the club of all Internet users; the clubs comprised of each individual ISP and its clients; and the clubs of national users. Maintaining the global reach and interoperability of the Internet, and thus maximizing its value to humanity, requires ensuring that access to these clubs remains open to all, and that restrictions on member behaviour do not exceed the minimum requirements of public safety.
The vibrancy of any club over time depends on its ability to respond effectively and legitimately to its members’ desires. This highlights the need to augment fora that enable discussion and potential revision of shared understandings about online rights and duties at each level of the nested clubs that comprise the Internet. Doing so will be especially difficult, but is particularly important at the most fundamental level — the club of all Internet users.
Beyond conceiving of the Internet as a series of nested clubs, thinking clearly about Internet governance requires attention to the legal forms employed. Legalization has been noted as a distinctive characteristic of modern international relations and global governance.16 A great deal of legalization
has taken the specific forms of multilateral treaties and the creation of formal, chartered international organizations; however, it is critical to avoid conflation of these particular mechanisms with the concept of legalization in general.17 For at least two main reasons it is likely that less formalized legal mechanisms will be more helpful and successful in this issue area for the foreseeable future.
Understanding the Internet as a set of nested clubs calls attention to the need to think explicitly about the rules for the three most basic types of clubs: the club of all Internet users; the clubs comprised of each individual ISP and its clients; and the clubs of national users. Maintaining the global reach and interoperability of the Internet, and thus maximizing its value to humanity, requires ensuring that access to these clubs remains open to all, and that restrictions on member behaviour do not exceed the minimum requirements of public safety.
The vibrancy of any club over time depends on its ability to respond effectively and legitimately to its members’ desires. This highlights the need to augment fora that enable discussion and potential revision of shared understandings about online rights and duties at each level of the nested clubs that comprise the Internet. Doing so will be especially difficult, but is particularly important at the most fundamental level — the club of all Internet users.
Beyond conceiving of the Internet as a series of nested clubs, thinking clearly about Internet governance requires attention to the legal forms employed. Legalization has been noted as a distinctive characteristic of modern international relations and global governance.16 A great deal of legalization
has taken the specific forms of multilateral treaties and the creation of formal, chartered international organizations; however, it is critical to avoid conflation of these particular mechanisms with the concept of legalization in general.17 For at least two main reasons it is likely that less formalized legal mechanisms will be more helpful and successful in this issue area for the foreseeable future.
First, Internet governance is a novel and highly
complex issue from the perspective of the diplomats
and government officials who will be tasked with
negotiating and implementing international rules.
While existing institutions tasked with Internet
governance have a greater degree of familiarity with
the technical issues involved, these organizations
lack expertise in the technical aspects of international
law, public policy and regulation. Kenneth Abbott
and Duncan Snidal (2000) have argued persuasively
that in complex, novel situations, so-called“soft law”
instruments (for example, voluntary codes of conduct
and best practices) are often a superior choice relative
to traditional“hard law”instruments such as treaties.
Their rationale is that soft law offers decision makers
opportunities to learn about the social effects of
particular sets of rules over time — and to amend them
accordingly, typically with lower negotiation costs
than entailed by the renegotiation of hard law (ibid.).
This pattern is especially likely to hold with respect
to the governance of cyber security. Just as attempts
to craft rules for the global governance of nuclear
weapons required an extended period of mutual (if
often highly conflictual) learning, attempts to govern
cyber-security and even to govern the Internet more
generally are likely to develop via various forms of
soft law and norm development prior to the creation
of any multilateral treaties or formal international
organizations. Put simply, states need time to learn
about the technology and to arrive at conclusions
about the kinds of governance arrangements they
prefer. The recent conclusion by the UN Group of
Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security that international
law applies in cyberspace is a welcome development,
but this must be understood as a starting point rather
than a conclusion (US Department of State, 2013).
Agreeing on specific interpretations for applying
general international legal rules to particular cases
will require a great deal of work.
Second, informal soft law instruments are also attractive, given the current political context for Internet governance, which is characterized by geopolitical rivalry and by disagreement over legitimate procedural rules. The distributional consequences of different Internet governance arrangements are not yet well understood, and states are increasingly sensitized to the potential for relative losses associated with being on the losing end of newly established institutions. This argument is related to the prior argument about the impact of uncertainty on the desirability of hard versus soft law instruments. Soft law instruments are also more attractive in this context because they are typically subject to less precise procedural rules. Whereas the procedures for creating a legally binding treaty are highly specific, the procedures and forms for creating informal codes of conduct are less demanding and require less prior agreement. They also allow more flexibility and innovation, thus increasing the scope for agreement between parties that do not agree completely on procedural rules.
These observations dovetail with the perspective on international law offered by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope (2010: 5), who argue that an exclusive
Second, informal soft law instruments are also attractive, given the current political context for Internet governance, which is characterized by geopolitical rivalry and by disagreement over legitimate procedural rules. The distributional consequences of different Internet governance arrangements are not yet well understood, and states are increasingly sensitized to the potential for relative losses associated with being on the losing end of newly established institutions. This argument is related to the prior argument about the impact of uncertainty on the desirability of hard versus soft law instruments. Soft law instruments are also more attractive in this context because they are typically subject to less precise procedural rules. Whereas the procedures for creating a legally binding treaty are highly specific, the procedures and forms for creating informal codes of conduct are less demanding and require less prior agreement. They also allow more flexibility and innovation, thus increasing the scope for agreement between parties that do not agree completely on procedural rules.
These observations dovetail with the perspective on international law offered by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope (2010: 5), who argue that an exclusive
focus on treaties and hard law is insufficient,
because it neglects what they call“the hard work of
international law” — or the ongoing social process
of enacting legal rules (whether hard or soft) by
interpreting and applying them in concrete cases.
On this view, law always entails soft law processes
and processes of adjudication that are vital to the
operation of even the most well-developed hard law
regime. International soft law, like domestic statutory
law, will never yield perfect compliance. Spoilers
may remain, but this is likely to be the case even
under the most well-developed treaty regime and,
thus, is not an argument against the advantages of
soft law instruments for rule-making, interpretation
and application in an uncertain environment
characterized by political contention.
Refining and updating Internet governance entails aprocessofrule-makingforaseriesofnestedclubs in a difficult and uncertain context that privileges procedural flexibility and a willingness to employ soft law instruments.
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE, RESEARCH-BASED VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE
The goal of this rule-making process should be a vibrant, responsibly governed Internet that safeguards privacy and other essential rights. The difficulty, of course, is managing the trade-offs between the distinct values and interests of a variety of public and private actors in an effective and legitimate manner. To date, both state and civil society actors have generally lacked coherent, comprehensive strategic visions of the kind of Internet they want and how to get there.
Refining and updating Internet governance entails aprocessofrule-makingforaseriesofnestedclubs in a difficult and uncertain context that privileges procedural flexibility and a willingness to employ soft law instruments.
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE, RESEARCH-BASED VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE
The goal of this rule-making process should be a vibrant, responsibly governed Internet that safeguards privacy and other essential rights. The difficulty, of course, is managing the trade-offs between the distinct values and interests of a variety of public and private actors in an effective and legitimate manner. To date, both state and civil society actors have generally lacked coherent, comprehensive strategic visions of the kind of Internet they want and how to get there.
The advanced industrial democracies and other
states committed to the maintenance of Internet
governance structures that balance security, rights
and economic dynamism have begun to devote
additional attention to these issues; however, these
efforts have lacked coordination both at the national
level (between agencies with a primary interest or
responsibility in one particular policy area) and at
the international level. The lack of a well-organized
coalition advancing what might be termed a liberal
democratic vision for Internet governance has left a
vacuum that is increasingly being filled by the more
authoritarian coalition led by Russia and China.
Given the expectations of good faith attempts at
compromise in many established international
organizations, the likelihood is that this coalition will
attain a portion of its agenda. This risk is amplified if
other states lack a positive vision and are routinely
in the position of simply blocking the coalition’s
proposals. In such a situation, wavering and currently
undecided states might be persuaded or induced
to support proposals that undermine basic rights,
alter the monetization of the Internet in ways that
coincide with Russian and Chinese interests, and
further establish a permissive environment for cyber
espionage and cyber attacks.
Similarly, while hacktivists and other highly motivated segments of the global community of Internet users have been adept at “naming and shaming” in cases where governments and
Similarly, while hacktivists and other highly motivated segments of the global community of Internet users have been adept at “naming and shaming” in cases where governments and
companies engage in questionable behaviour,18 the
diversity of this community and its strong normative
bias in favour of decentralized social organization
complicate efforts to articulate a coherent, positive
vision for Internet governance that extends beyond
denunciation of attempts to alter the status
quo. Further, many members of this community
understand themselves to primarily be ”activists.”
Such an identity can encourage mono-value thinking
antithetical to a governance mindset, which attempts
to balance and partially satisfy multiple perspectives
and values in cases of tension or conflict.
The diversity of basic social institutions among democracies suggests there is little chance that there is a unique legitimate liberal democratic system of Internet governance. Indeed, given that modern global governance often leans heavily on the principle of subsidiarity, crucial components of Internet governance are likely to continue to reside at the national level and, therefore, handled differently by different political communities. Having a coherent, legitimate strategic vision for Internet governance does not mean an all-encompassing multilateral treaty or even an informal global agreement on every issue. Rather, the key is to identify critical issues where truly global norms, rules and standards are required. On other issues, especially including rights, it will be necessary to identify broad parameters that bound legitimate difference in state practices.
The diversity of basic social institutions among democracies suggests there is little chance that there is a unique legitimate liberal democratic system of Internet governance. Indeed, given that modern global governance often leans heavily on the principle of subsidiarity, crucial components of Internet governance are likely to continue to reside at the national level and, therefore, handled differently by different political communities. Having a coherent, legitimate strategic vision for Internet governance does not mean an all-encompassing multilateral treaty or even an informal global agreement on every issue. Rather, the key is to identify critical issues where truly global norms, rules and standards are required. On other issues, especially including rights, it will be necessary to identify broad parameters that bound legitimate difference in state practices.
Among the principles critical to a liberal democratic
view of Internet governance are: guarantees of due
process, freedom of expression and other basic
freedoms; mixed public and private ownership
of property, with a government regulatory and
oversight role to protect public interests and to correct
market failures; compliance with international law,
especially including restriction on hostile acts to
instances of self-defence and collectively authorized
response to threats; and the creation, alteration
and interpretation of rules in good faith and in
accordance with transparent, mutually accepted
rules of procedure.
There are tensions within and between these principles. For example, certain kinds of speech are often deemed incompatible with other basic freedoms. Restrictions on both privacy and due process are sometimes deemed acceptable in the name of ensuring public safety. The appropriate scope of state regulatory involvement in areas of private investment is also politically controversial. With respect to hostile acts, the last decade witnessed a notable and as-yet-unresolved debate on the legitimate scope for preventive (as opposed to pre- emptive) self-help action.
As a result, a complete strategic vision for Internet governance must go beyond first principles to explicitly contemplate these and other key trade- offs. It must provide guidance in differentiating critical areas for global rule-making from other areas that, while important, are best handled at regional, bilateral, national and even sub-national levels. On these latter issues, a strategic vision should, where possible and appropriate, go at least some distance toward discussing the bounds of legitimate difference in state conduct while recognizing that answers to these questions must, ultimately, be crafted by states themselves in consultation with civil society and other relevant actors.
There are tensions within and between these principles. For example, certain kinds of speech are often deemed incompatible with other basic freedoms. Restrictions on both privacy and due process are sometimes deemed acceptable in the name of ensuring public safety. The appropriate scope of state regulatory involvement in areas of private investment is also politically controversial. With respect to hostile acts, the last decade witnessed a notable and as-yet-unresolved debate on the legitimate scope for preventive (as opposed to pre- emptive) self-help action.
As a result, a complete strategic vision for Internet governance must go beyond first principles to explicitly contemplate these and other key trade- offs. It must provide guidance in differentiating critical areas for global rule-making from other areas that, while important, are best handled at regional, bilateral, national and even sub-national levels. On these latter issues, a strategic vision should, where possible and appropriate, go at least some distance toward discussing the bounds of legitimate difference in state conduct while recognizing that answers to these questions must, ultimately, be crafted by states themselves in consultation with civil society and other relevant actors.
A strategic vision must also be research-based. While
a great deal of attention has been paid to specific
Internet issues in a number of academic disciplines,
there has been a relative neglect of core governance
issues. Accordingly, CIGI has commissioned a set
of papers from leading experts that address both a
range of pressing governance challenges and also
the international political implications of a handful
of the most likely Internet governance scenarios in
the 2015–2020 timeframe. The papers, of which this
is the first in a series, are divided into two clusters.
The first cluster identifies the pressing near-term governance challenges on a number of fronts. These will include technical standards and the governance of interconnection, cyber security issues, including state efforts at monitoring and surveillance, civil society hacktivism by groups such as Anonymous and the future of intellectual property in a digital age.
The second cluster of papers examines various plausible outcomes for Internet governance in the remainder of the current decade and attempts to assay their implications for global governance and the international system as a whole.These papers are, of necessity, somewhat speculative; however, social science has developed scenario-based methods for forecasting the proximate future within reasonable tolerances.19
In order to impart a degree of structure and comparability to the scenario papers, authors were asked to consider and engage with four ideal-typical scenarios. The first entails incremental change to the current model for Internet governance built largely around ICANN and the IETF. The second involves the creation of largely self-contained yet functional “blocs”; for example, an Internet comprised largely
The first cluster identifies the pressing near-term governance challenges on a number of fronts. These will include technical standards and the governance of interconnection, cyber security issues, including state efforts at monitoring and surveillance, civil society hacktivism by groups such as Anonymous and the future of intellectual property in a digital age.
The second cluster of papers examines various plausible outcomes for Internet governance in the remainder of the current decade and attempts to assay their implications for global governance and the international system as a whole.These papers are, of necessity, somewhat speculative; however, social science has developed scenario-based methods for forecasting the proximate future within reasonable tolerances.19
In order to impart a degree of structure and comparability to the scenario papers, authors were asked to consider and engage with four ideal-typical scenarios. The first entails incremental change to the current model for Internet governance built largely around ICANN and the IETF. The second involves the creation of largely self-contained yet functional “blocs”; for example, an Internet comprised largely
of users from OECD-member states, and another
of users primarily drawn from Russia, China and
the Arab world. Each bloc would have distinct
governance structures and global interoperability
could be expected to be both technologically limited
and subject to substantial political control. Third,
authors were asked to consider an outcome in which
failure to agree on a global Internet governance
regime for key issues leads to major breakdowns in
interoperability and in the basic functioning of the
Internet. While this kind of generalized governance
failure is relatively unlikely, there is reason to think
carefully about low-probability, high-significance
outcomes.This is especially true in complex and novel
issue areas, where the implications of new rules and
other actions are not well understood in advance.
The final scenario is one in which hacktivists (such
as Anonymous), cyber criminals, terrorists and other
groups successfully destabilize large portions of the
Internet as an expression of protest.
These scenarios are intended as analytical aids rather than straitjackets. Reality is not expected to wholly match any of them; rather, it will blend elements of multiple scenarios, including some not enumerated here. However, it is also true that the four scenarios are not equally probable. So long as there is some realistic prospect of identifying and selecting policy that is more likely to lead to better outcomes, such efforts to understand the costs and benefits of alternate outcomes remains worthwhile.
Together, these two clusters of papers provide: a clear
sense of the critical problems facing efforts to update
and refine Internet governance; the appropriate
modalities for doing so; and the costs and benefits
associated with the most plausible outcomes. They
therefore provide the foundation for developing the
research-based, high-level strategic vision required
to successfully navigate a complex, shifting and
uncertain governance environment.These scenarios are intended as analytical aids rather than straitjackets. Reality is not expected to wholly match any of them; rather, it will blend elements of multiple scenarios, including some not enumerated here. However, it is also true that the four scenarios are not equally probable. So long as there is some realistic prospect of identifying and selecting policy that is more likely to lead to better outcomes, such efforts to understand the costs and benefits of alternate outcomes remains worthwhile.
Notes:
7 On rules in social life and specifically in international relations, see Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (1989), World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1991), Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On the connection between rule-making and power, see also Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005),“Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1: 39–75. Finally, on rules about rule-making, see H.L.A. Hart (1994), The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8 On “thick multilateralism,” see John Gerard Ruggie (1992), “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3: 561–598. For further discussion, see Christian Reus-Smit (1999), The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9 The G-77 is a working coalition of developing states in the United Nations. It now includes 132 active members; for a current list, see: www.g77.org/doc/members.html.
10 To read the full text of “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” see: https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final. html.
11 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
12 These groupings can be thought of as nested clubs, in the sense of“club goods”(as opposed to common goods).
13 For a military assertion, see Maj. Gen. Mark Barrett et al. (2011), “Assured Access to the Global Commons,” Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk: NATO, available at: www.act.nato. int/mainpages/globalcommons. A commons mentality is evident in the statements and actions of Anonymous, at least after 2008. See Coleman (forthcoming 2013).
14 Two critical works on the concept of the common goods and
Press. spamhaus-used-internet-against-itself.html?hpw&abra=test&_r=0.
16 See Kenneth W. Abbott et al. (2000), “The Concept of Legalization,”International Organization 54, no. 3: 410–419.
17 This point has been recognized both by rationalist scholars and by scholars of international law drawing on constructivist theories of international relations. For the rationalist view, see Abbott and Snidal (2000). For the constructivist view, see Brunnée and Toope (2010).
18 The Chilling Effects website is one example of such a campaign; see www.chillingeffects.org. There are also indications of emerging alliances between hacktivists and civil society groups engaged in protest over other issues. See Boris Manenti (2013), “Hacktivism United: NGOs, Hackers Team Up to Take Down Common Enemies,” Worldcrunch, February 5, available at: www.worldcrunch.com/tech- science/hacktivism-united-ngos-hackers-team-up-to-take-down- common-enemies/anonymous-hacking-activists-greenpeace-internet/ c4s10811/#.UTjNNTD_l8F. Such campaigns appear to follow many of the patterns identified in Keck and Sikkink (2002).
19 See, for example, Steven Bernstein et al. (2000),“God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World,”European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1: 43–76.
WORKS CITED
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2000).“Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.”International Organization 54, no. 3: 421–456.
Brunnée, Jutta and Stephen J. Toope (2010). Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coleman, Gabriella (forthcoming 2013).“Anonymous in Context.”CIGI Internet Governance Paper Series No. 3.
DeNardis, Laura (2009). Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Glasius, Marlies (2006). The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement. New York: Routledge.
Glenny, Misha (2011). Dark Market: How Hackers Became the New Mafia. Toronto: Anansi.
Information Warfare Monitor (2009).“Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network.”Available at: www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking- GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage- Network.
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (2002). Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Mandiant (2013).“APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units.” Available at: http://intelreport. mandiant.com/.
7 On rules in social life and specifically in international relations, see Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (1989), World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1991), Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On the connection between rule-making and power, see also Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005),“Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1: 39–75. Finally, on rules about rule-making, see H.L.A. Hart (1994), The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8 On “thick multilateralism,” see John Gerard Ruggie (1992), “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3: 561–598. For further discussion, see Christian Reus-Smit (1999), The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9 The G-77 is a working coalition of developing states in the United Nations. It now includes 132 active members; for a current list, see: www.g77.org/doc/members.html.
10 To read the full text of “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” see: https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final. html.
11 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
12 These groupings can be thought of as nested clubs, in the sense of“club goods”(as opposed to common goods).
13 For a military assertion, see Maj. Gen. Mark Barrett et al. (2011), “Assured Access to the Global Commons,” Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk: NATO, available at: www.act.nato. int/mainpages/globalcommons. A commons mentality is evident in the statements and actions of Anonymous, at least after 2008. See Coleman (forthcoming 2013).
14 Two critical works on the concept of the common goods and
the problems associated with their management are Garrett Hardin
(1968),“The Tragedy of the Commons,”Science 162, no. 3859: 1243–1248,
and Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University
(1968),“The Tragedy of the Commons,”Science 162, no. 3859: 1243–1248,
and Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University
16 See Kenneth W. Abbott et al. (2000), “The Concept of Legalization,”International Organization 54, no. 3: 410–419.
17 This point has been recognized both by rationalist scholars and by scholars of international law drawing on constructivist theories of international relations. For the rationalist view, see Abbott and Snidal (2000). For the constructivist view, see Brunnée and Toope (2010).
18 The Chilling Effects website is one example of such a campaign; see www.chillingeffects.org. There are also indications of emerging alliances between hacktivists and civil society groups engaged in protest over other issues. See Boris Manenti (2013), “Hacktivism United: NGOs, Hackers Team Up to Take Down Common Enemies,” Worldcrunch, February 5, available at: www.worldcrunch.com/tech- science/hacktivism-united-ngos-hackers-team-up-to-take-down- common-enemies/anonymous-hacking-activists-greenpeace-internet/ c4s10811/#.UTjNNTD_l8F. Such campaigns appear to follow many of the patterns identified in Keck and Sikkink (2002).
19 See, for example, Steven Bernstein et al. (2000),“God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World,”European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1: 43–76.
WORKS CITED
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2000).“Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.”International Organization 54, no. 3: 421–456.
Brunnée, Jutta and Stephen J. Toope (2010). Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coleman, Gabriella (forthcoming 2013).“Anonymous in Context.”CIGI Internet Governance Paper Series No. 3.
DeNardis, Laura (2009). Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Glasius, Marlies (2006). The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement. New York: Routledge.
Glenny, Misha (2011). Dark Market: How Hackers Became the New Mafia. Toronto: Anansi.
Information Warfare Monitor (2009).“Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network.”Available at: www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking- GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage- Network.
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (2002). Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Mandiant (2013).“APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units.” Available at: http://intelreport. mandiant.com/.
O’Brien, Robert et al. (2000). Contesting Global Governance:
Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social
Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pfanner, Eric (2012). “U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty.” New York Times, December 13. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/14iht- treaty14.html.
Price, Richard (1998). “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.” International Organization 52, no. 3: 613–644.
Raymond, Mark (2011).“Social Change in World Politics: Secondary Rules and Institutional Politics.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Toronto, Canada.
US Department of State (2013).“Statement on Consensus Achieved by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber Issues,” press release, June 7. Available at: www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210418.htm.
Wang, Stephanie (2007). “Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma.”OpenNet Initiative Bulletin. Available at: https://opennet.net/ sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Bulletin_Burma_2007. pdf.
Williams, Christopher (2011). “How Egypt Shut Down the Internet.” The Telegraph, January 28. Available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/egypt/8288163/How-Egypt- shut-down-the-internet.html.
Pfanner, Eric (2012). “U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty.” New York Times, December 13. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/14iht- treaty14.html.
Price, Richard (1998). “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.” International Organization 52, no. 3: 613–644.
Raymond, Mark (2011).“Social Change in World Politics: Secondary Rules and Institutional Politics.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Toronto, Canada.
US Department of State (2013).“Statement on Consensus Achieved by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber Issues,” press release, June 7. Available at: www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210418.htm.
Wang, Stephanie (2007). “Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma.”OpenNet Initiative Bulletin. Available at: https://opennet.net/ sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Bulletin_Burma_2007. pdf.
Williams, Christopher (2011). “How Egypt Shut Down the Internet.” The Telegraph, January 28. Available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/egypt/8288163/How-Egypt- shut-down-the-internet.html.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Mark Raymond
Mark Raymond joined CIGI as a research fellow in August 2012. He has a B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Western Ontario and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Toronto, and he has taught international relations at the University of Toronto and the University of Waterloo. His research interests include international law and organization, international security and international history, including the history of global governance.
At CIGI, Mark contributes to the Global Security Program. Specifically, he is developing CIGI’s work in the area of Internet security and governance.
Gordon Smith
A political science graduate of McGill University (B.A.) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D.), Gordon Smith became interested in international security and global interdependence while attending university in the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After graduation, Gordon returned to Canada to work on these issues, and began a long and distinguished career as a public servant with the federal government.
Initially, Gordon worked on Canada’s relationship with NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) within the Ministry of Defence and Department of External Affairs, but he quickly advanced to more demanding positions in the Privy Council Office. In 1979, Gordon became the deputy under-secretary of state at External Affairs, and in 1985, deputy minister. Shortly thereafter, he was dispatched to Brussels as the permanent representative and ambassador to the Canadian delegation to NATO, and subsequently, was named Canada’s ambassador to the European Union.
Returning to Canada in 1994, Gordon was appointed deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, where he fondly remembers establishing a global issues bureau in the ministry to better understand emerging transnational trends affecting Canada. During this time, Gordon began
Mark Raymond
Mark Raymond joined CIGI as a research fellow in August 2012. He has a B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Western Ontario and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Toronto, and he has taught international relations at the University of Toronto and the University of Waterloo. His research interests include international law and organization, international security and international history, including the history of global governance.
At CIGI, Mark contributes to the Global Security Program. Specifically, he is developing CIGI’s work in the area of Internet security and governance.
Gordon Smith
A political science graduate of McGill University (B.A.) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D.), Gordon Smith became interested in international security and global interdependence while attending university in the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After graduation, Gordon returned to Canada to work on these issues, and began a long and distinguished career as a public servant with the federal government.
Initially, Gordon worked on Canada’s relationship with NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) within the Ministry of Defence and Department of External Affairs, but he quickly advanced to more demanding positions in the Privy Council Office. In 1979, Gordon became the deputy under-secretary of state at External Affairs, and in 1985, deputy minister. Shortly thereafter, he was dispatched to Brussels as the permanent representative and ambassador to the Canadian delegation to NATO, and subsequently, was named Canada’s ambassador to the European Union.
Returning to Canada in 1994, Gordon was appointed deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, where he fondly remembers establishing a global issues bureau in the ministry to better understand emerging transnational trends affecting Canada. During this time, Gordon began
his personal involvement with the G7/G8, as the Sherpa (personal representative) for the prime minister at the G7/ G8 summits in Halifax, Lyon and Denver. After retiring from the Government of Canada that same year, Gordon joined the University of Victoria as executive director of the Centre for Global Studies (CFGS), and was appointed chair of the board of governors at the International Development Research Centre. During this period, he also lectured as a visiting professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the University of Westminster in London and Paris.
After collaborating with the think tank for many years on various projects, Gordon joined CIGI in 2010 as a distinguished fellow, and has since been a key contributor to its G20 research activities, events and publications. He looks forward to continuing this work at CIGI, and pursuing another long-time interest: the convergence of technology and global affairs (you can follow Gordon on Twitter @GordonSmithG20).
Source: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no1_4.pdf
After collaborating with the think tank for many years on various projects, Gordon joined CIGI in 2010 as a distinguished fellow, and has since been a key contributor to its G20 research activities, events and publications. He looks forward to continuing this work at CIGI, and pursuing another long-time interest: the convergence of technology and global affairs (you can follow Gordon on Twitter @GordonSmithG20).
Source: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no1_4.pdf
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